Purpose of the article is to partially describe underpinning economics for the circular economy. A circular economy (closed-loop system) is an advancement from the linear economy (open-loop system) which behaves according to the hierarchy of 6R, preferring reuse, remanufacture or recycle solutions insead of disposal (known also as a "linear dead-end"). This new approach is a trigger of new business models seeking many times vor various kinds of support from the side of government. However, governmental support is not neither the only option nor the most functional one. Underpinning economics for the circular economy can be based also at market-based tools. What we have in mind under this term for the purspose of this paper is the game in the market being played between buyers and sellers. Methodology: We have analyzed this interaction using game theory tool (interactive decision theory). The scietific goal of our paper was to suggest a quick market-based solution how to support circular economy business models whilst helping to the society to solve certain social problems. Our findings have led to a newly proposed way, how the current game in pricing could be changed. An emphasis shall be placed on strategies how to rise prices of linear economy products whilst offering wider social benefits to small sellers of such products. The price increase of linear economy products is considered in this paper as a market-based incentive to support recycled, remanufactured ones, whilst circular economy products are becoming more economically feasible in comparison with more expensive linear economy products.
Introduction
The role of a game theory in this paper is to replace standard approach which was in some cases very useful, but on the other hand, with typical side effects jeopardizing full functionality of such incentives. At this point, we have in mind command-and-control tools like taxation, subsidization, duties and limitations posed by government. The goal of environmental tax is to change the behaviour of tax subject instead of providing state authorities with additional revenue. The typical drawbacks of environmental taxation are depicted in Figure 1 . In given example, there is uniform environmental tax rate imposed (300 EUR/t), companies are paying for excessive CO2 emissions (CO2 emissions are only one type of harmful emissions). Tax is being calculated for additional mass of emissions released. As it is evident from the Figure 1 , there is an individual Marginal Abatement Cost curve for every company. When emissions reach individual threshold, it is becoming cheaper for companies to pay the tax than to abate emissions. Our proposed market-based solution is designed to overcome barriers typical for command-and-control mechanisms:
 Every producer differs in terms of work organization and technology, even if we consider the same industry. Uniform environmental tax rate application leads to different results per company -we may find companies for which it is cheaper to pay the tax than to mitigate additional tons of emissions. From this, it is evident that uniform solutions do not work well and individual adaptation to every single company is not possible from the perspective of central authority (maybe only in case of small regions or small economies like e.g. Slovenia),  command-and-control mechanisms require controlling of their functionality from the side of state authority or institutions like Environmental Investigation Agency, which imposes additional costs and consumes time,  the time gap between invention and realization is too wide in case of command-and-control mechanisms. This is mostly caused by the length of legislation process,  etc. 
Game theory supported market-based solution
Using web-based game theory tools, better conditions for underpinning economics leading to further development and future implementation of business models that facilitate the transition towards a circular economy could be created. Our two suggestions belong to market-based mechanisms influencing, in our case, entire chains of production. The first tool is changing the game in pricing, having multiple effect:  To raise prices of linear economy products in order to help suppliers to receive adequate payments for their work (wider social sustainability benefits)  By raised prices of linear economy products, to push manufacturers into search for alternative, circular economy solutions Transformational change is required from corporate sector and from government (rethinking taxation and pursuing more suitable set of regulations). Production efficiency efforts are negated by rising consumption and material dependence. Recently, many companies have begun to notice that linear economics ("take -make -dispose" pattern) increases their exposure to risks, most notably, higher resource prices, the start of the new millennium marks the turning point when real prices of natural resources began to surge upwards, essentially erasing a century's worth of real price declines (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013) . The situation is well documented by the Energy return on investment indicator. Oil for instance, once gave over 100:1 EROI with easily available oil deposits that were rich, high quality, and of vast quantities, today that number is closer to 7:1 (when the ratio comes to 1:1, it is no longer profitable or cost effective to pursue) . According to McKinsey Global Institute report (McKinsey, 2011) , those are reasons causing excessive depletion of natural resources:
 The low level of resource prices, relative to labour costs, has also created the current wasteful system of resource use,  reusing materials has not been a major economic priority, given the ease of obtaining new input materials and cheaply disposing of refuse,  the biggest economic efficiency gains have resulted from using more resources, especially energy, to reduce labour costs,  etc. The emergence of circular economy idea dates back to early 1980s and its further development is accompanied by the commodity price increase (see figure 2). The world industrial inputs price index (the reference year 2005 = 100%) rises steeply until the year 2011 (following decline is caused mostly by economic factors). However, from the year 1985 till 2015, the price level of industrial inputs more than doubled. There are several factors that may cause commodity price increase:

Tighter environmental standards,  resource scarcity,  increased demand for raw materials (if marginal cost curve is steep, small shifts in demand may cause large price swings),  weather patterns (e.g. global warming),  inflation, political risks,  game theory tools (our 1st tool)  etc. Our 1st suggested web-based tool is built-up at sensitivity of company managements towards price volatility. When commodity prices rise, companies report a hit on profits due to sharp increases in input costs. Shifting from linear economy solutions towards circular economy value chain is one of the ways how to offset those losses. Position of our game theory tools within circular economy "butterfy" is depicted in the figure 3. 2 Examples of open-loop system suppliers benefiting from the 1st tool Generally, the current societal problem not only in the European Union is income inequality caused by excessive profits on one hand and by insufficient earnings on the other hand. Model cases are for example cocoa workers in rainforests (e.g. ADM, Cargill & Nestle case from 2005) or small cloth producers in Slovakia. Slovak suppliers to European cloth companies are being paid minimum wage, whilst their products are being sold as luxurious in the European Union. The basic problem in these and similar cases is the low bargaining power of small suppliers -with their limited access to international market, they depend only on those multinational companies with distribution channels penetrating their disadvantaged regions. Poor salaries and wages of African cocoa workers are caused by the game played between farmers and wholesalers, where purchasing price is being reduced due to the low bargaining power of farmers. Similar cases like this are in almost every industry.
Functioning of proposed tools
The first driver our tools are based on is "Changing the Game" in way, how purchasing price is being negotiated. Within web-based platform, we will enable to the offer to meet the demand. The suggestion is to realize this in a smaller scale as a pioneering step -players will be from three selected industries. The played interaction is modelled firstly as a game with perfect information -where all information sets in the tree contain just one node, a singleton (Figure 4 ) and the final state is being depicted as a game with imperfect information (using behavioral strategies) ( Figure 5 ). Information set of player i is a collection of player i's nodes among which i cannot distinguish. In figure 5 , buyer doesn't know the previous decision of a supplier -whether a supplier started negotiation with other potential buyer or not. In our game with finite horizon, we have two players, player I. represents buyer of non-recycled material -a player with higher bargaining power (usually bigger manufacturing company) and player II. represents supplier side -players with lower bargaining power. The supremacy of buyers is also derived from the fact that there is usually a lower number of them in comparison with the amount of those willing to sell their material. Nodes are being explained in Table 1 . The price negotiation game we know today is being depicted in Figure 4 . Buyer offers price, which is unfair (player I. plays Down), whilst supplier does not have an option to start negotiation with other potential buyer (there are various reasons for this, e.g. supplier is not informed about actual needs of other buyers), therefore, player II. plays right. Sequentially, it is then turn of player I., who plays Down -offers unfair price to the supplier. The price negotiation game was analyzed using game theory. With our web-based tool, we are changing the game in price negotiation. The negotiation will take place on-line using web based tool. Buyers will not be given information how many suppliers logged in -in the game, they will not be able to distinguish, whether supplier started negotiation with other buyer. Avoiding monopolies and respecting antitrust principles, buyers will neither be informed about each others' presence in the game (web-based tool will reveal neither identity of players, nor their number). Under such conditions, the game theory analysis shows , in the whole game, the equilibrium situation in the node with payoff vector [0,4] -buyer is immediately offering fair price to the supplier at the beginning of the game and the game ends up like this. For the whole game and subgame, see the figure 5.
Figure 5 Subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies Subgame perfect equilibrium is every strategy profile, in which player 1 plays U with the probability 1, and player 2, after history (D), plays r with probability 1. The outcome of the game in every subgame perfect equilibrium is the terminal history (U) with payoff vector [0, 4] . Subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies are (Uu,r) and (Ud,r).
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Step-by-step description of the use of the 1st tool -interaction between suppliers (farmers, SMEs, sole traders) and producers (manufacturing companies)
1. Every manufacturing company has a database of its suppliers and in almost all cases, there is a higher number of suppliers of one single commodity (buyer is selecting from them). Manufacturer of metal products from Brescia has for example a list of 22 suppliers of stainless steel to be selected from -from this fact, a higher bargaining power of buyer is derived. 2. Buyers and suppliers will log into the web-based tool. They will be both explained the rules of the game: 1) Identities of suppliers and buyers remain unknown. 2) Game has rounds, if there is remaining unsold quantity at the end of the round, another game is played. 3) Buyer will not be informed about prices offered by other buyers. 4) The highest price wins -opportunity to sell will be equally distributed among all participating suppliers -they will all be offered to sell equal proportion to buyer offering the highest price. 3. Players remain unknown to each other avoiding monopolies and respecting antitrust principles. When offer match the demand, the will receive certificate with agreed amount and purchasing price and they can officially conclude the business deal. This is not a pure cooperation, but a cooperative attitude and novelty of this economic system is expressed by the fact that since a business deal is equally distributed among all (wider social sustainability benefits), this is not anymore e "zero-sum game", a case when one's win is automatically another one's loose.
The simplified example of the game is depicted in the table 2. Three manufacturers from metal industry are purchasing stainless steel. They need 200 kilograms each, in the first round, the highest price offered by buyer (manufacturer) 1 was accepted by suppliers as a fair price (every supplier from the group of 20 suppliers supplied 10 kilograms, based on the equal distribution of opportunity). The total offer is 520 kilograms. In the following round, the fair price is announced to buyers who didn't make a deal in order to allow them to adapt the price. In this case, remaining two buyers filled their need in the second round only up to 80% because suppliers altogether didn't possess 200 kg of stainless steel for every buyer. 
2nd tool -Interaction between producers (manufacturing companies) and end consumers + Interaction between suppliers (farmers, SMEs, sole traders)
Entire production chain typical for circular economy represents a "vicious" circle. There are (at least!) two points, where product enters the market (see Figure 6 ):
1. As a finalized product 2. As a recycled material Our second tool uses game theory as a tool of prognostic cogitation. It helps to project real market situation which is a very important step in terms of underpinning economics enhancing transition towards a circular economy. There is always a problem for company managements to predict salable quantities of their products. Unsold products are worsening financial situation of a company and represent environmental burden. There is a well-known "post-Christmas sales effect", when products are being sold undervalued. This is a solution of how to circumvent the problem of the scarcity of resources by providing companies with guidance (tool) on how to better match the production setup to the customer's needs. An application of the game theory (Cournot game) would lead to less energy resources being consumed since it would help a company to better prevent excessive (not needed) production. The Cournot game tool was developed in cooperation with the management of PintInox, S. p. A. Economic advice given by the 2nd tool is as follows:
• What is the saleable amount of production?
• Is there a chance to reach break-even point? • What could be the ideal size of the business? The tool is aimed at the most important phase of the product life cycle -market penetration where the value of the product is set up and where the customer/consumer (civil society) represents the decision maker -the one who decides about the success or failure of the eco-innovation process.
Figure 6 Two points in a "vicious" circle where we need to use game theory as a foresighting technique
Following Table 3 offers links to the detailed description of the 2nd tool. The final outcome from using the Cournot game is the ability to identify a sustainable system which is in this case an amount of production fitted to the market needs (i.e. the saleable quantities). Company managements receive a tool which protects them from overproduction. The Cournot game helps to diminish the difference between both the produced/overproduced and sold amounts. Table 4 gives an overview, how the Cournot game could work as part of the web-based tool. Table 4 Step-by-step description of how the 2nd tool works in practice
Step-by-step description of how the 2 nd tool works in practice
Interaction between producers (manufacturing companies) and end consumers
Interaction between suppliers (farmers, SMEs, sole traders) themselves and manufacturing companies
(1) Purchasing price determination Manufacturing companies will determine their willingness to deliver specified amount of products for respective price
The system will work with purchasing prices determined by the 1 st tool (2) Participants Manufacturing companies in the role of sellers and end consumers (households, B2B partners) in the role of buyers.
Farmers, SMEs, sole traders and other collectors, producers of recycled material to be used by manufacturing companies in the role of suppliers and manufacturing companies in the role of buyers.
(3) Personal data protection Respecting the antitrust principles and avoiding monopolies, players within the system will not be mutually informed about each other's identity. However, this does not preclude players from cooperation outside of the process of sell/purchase. The paper is aimed at promotion of cooperative behaviour of companies, but the sell/purchase phase remains excluded from this philosophy.
(4) Identification of demand The demand is based at preferences of final consumers.
The demand is based at preferences of manufacturing companies. Those preferences are already entered into the system by the 1 st tool (5) Position within the chain of production This interaction examines market entry of finalized product
This interaction examines purchase of material to be used for production of finalized product Source: Own elaboration
Conclusion
Presented paper has shown how game theory analysis looks like in the field of sustainable developement, when thinking about possible ways, how to make shift from linear economy system towards circular one much easier and feasible. Based on many documented situations favoring sustainable societal development collaboration among different organizations before competition, game theory explains to entrepreneurs how and why to assign higher value to collaborative initiatives in their external surroundings. To name a few opinions confirming supremacy of collaborative mode over the competitive one, we could start with Jean Jacques Rousseau and his Stag Hunt Game (type of the game theory). This game tells us that two players (hunters) can achieve greater success if they collaborate than in a situation when everyone is acting individually. A well-known rebound effect or take-back effect in all sustainability initiatives happens when technical innovation is not linked to behavioural strategy. Paradox of W. S. Jevons from 1865 tells the story how higher efficiency in coal burning has led to higher coal consumption. Game theory links new models and economic incentives for circular economy business to entrepreneurial behaviour, whilst promoting collaborative attitude (see figure 7) . We are living an epoque of constant change; the current industrial revolution is labelled as Industry 4.0, being accompanied by Web 2.0 and CSR 2.0 paradigm shifts. Industry 4.0 foressees collaboration tendencies in order to better adapt mass production outcomes to individual consumer needs. Figure 7 Entrepreneurial behaviour in Circular economy, Source: Own elaboration Web 2.0 is, among other improvements, introducing social software for companies enabling peer-topeer tracking of activities of partner's company. Network issues are generalized as "Internet of things and services". Under this term, we understand processes like for example: Dynamic business and engineering processes enabling last-minute changes to production and delivering the ability to respond flexibly to disruptions and failures on behalf of suppliers, or optimised decision-making, resulting in new ways of creating value and novel business models 1 . Latest trends tell us that business models in circular economy will be internet/web based, the purpose of the paper was to provide reader with information how pre-steps before creation of a concrete model look like. In a pre-step, we were using game theory as a methodology assisting us with analysis of players -companies and consumers in linear and circular economy. With game theory, we created scenarios how the web-based tool could function. This was the first, research phase of the project we plan to realize with partners from abroad. Before smaller-scale applications of new ideas, game theory is being used for theoretical analysis how the situation could develop. The next step is the search for already existing web-based solution, where a game could possibly be applied. If it is a completely new kind of interaction invented, then the webbased tool will be a pioneering realization of an idea.
